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A Japanese plan to invade Australia during World War Two has been much 
disputed. Nevertheless, the safety of Australia throughout the Pacific campaign, 
especially during 1942, was far from assured. This thesis examines the impact of 
the Battle of the Coral Sea in maintaining the safety of Australia during the 
Second World War. The impact of the battle has been undecided over the years. It 
was originally dubbed the battle that saved Australia. This view, has however, 
changed over the ensuing years. Several theories have been put forward over 
those years, including that the battle was indeed what saved Australia, whilst 
other battles such as Kokoda have also claimed this honour. On the other hand 
some commentators have claimed there was no threat of Japanese invasion. 
 
I argue that the Battle of the Coral Sea was a significant milestone in not only the 
safety of Australia, but in the wider Pacific War. The Battle of the Coral Sea 
should be seen as being a stepping stone in which the Allies were able to gain 
control of the Pacific, the first step to the undisputed safety of Australia. To gain 
a clearer understanding of the role the battle played, we must examine the battle 
itself, the government response, its relationship to the Battle of Midway and the 
way in which it has been commemorated. 
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   1 
Introduction 
Invasion is a menace capable hourly of becoming an actuality. I tell you 
bluntly that the whole world may very well shake within the next few 
weeks under the blows that full-scale warfare will strike – and Australia 
cannot escape a blow. We face vital, perilous weeks fraught with 
exceedingly important happenings for Australia.
1
- Prime Minister John Curtin 
 
 
Australia entered the Second World War on 3 September 1939 when Britain 
declared war on Germany following the German invasion of Poland. Fighting 
alongside British forces, Australians had been located in North Africa, the Middle 
East and the Mediterranean. Although the Australian Army was not involved in 
direct conflict until 1941, the Royal Australian Navy and Air Force had been 
reasonably active. Australian pilots had taken part in the Battle of Britain, whilst 
the navy had been quite successful in the Mediterranean. War seemed a distant 
activity from the Australian mainland. This changed on 7 December 1941, when 
the Imperial Japanese Navy attacked Pearl Harbor, the United States naval base in 
Hawaii. This surprise attack, one of history’s most infamous days, brought the 
war closer to Australia. Although the United States military was sparked into 
action, they were unable to produce any results of great significance for several 
months. The Japanese had begun an unrelenting wave of successful attacks 
throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Islands began falling like dominos. The 
                                                           
1 Quoted in: Bob Wurth, Australia’s Greatest Peril: 1942, (Sydney: Pan Macmillan, 2010), 199.   2 
Americans were now in a war from which they had so long abstained, and the war 
was bearing down on Australia.  
 
The fall of Singapore in February 1942 and the rapid Japanese expansion through 
the Philippines were major factors in the early parts of the Pacific campaign. 
These two island nations left the rest of the South Asia-Pacific region vulnerable 
to attack. The British had lost two of their most powerful warships, Prince of 
Wales and Repulse, in Asian waters at the end of 1941, and the Battle of Sunda 
Strait caused further losses for the Allies in early 1942. The Pacific situation was 
becoming a nightmare for the Allies as they were systematically pushed out of the 
Asia-Pacific region.  
 
The Japanese occupation of Singapore and the Dutch East Indies brought the 
enemy closer to Australia and increased the fear of invasion that the Australian 
population felt. The war came to Australian shores on 19 February 1942 when 
Darwin was bombed. This marked the first time that the Australian mainland had 
come under attack from an enemy force. Prime Minister John Curtin stated at the 
time that Australians should “vow that this blow at Darwin and the loss it has 
involved and the suffering it has occasioned shall gird our loins and nerve our 
steel.”
2 By November 1943 Darwin had been bombed over 60 times.
3
                                                           
2 Quoted in: David Black and Lesley Wallace, John Curtin: Guide to Archives of Australia’s Prime Ministers, 
(ACT: National Archives of Australia, 2004), 21. 
 Bombings 
of several towns in Western Australia and Queensland also occurred during 1942 
and 1943.  
3 “Australia’s War 1939-1945: Air Raids” http://www.ww2australia.gov.au/underattack/airraid.html (accessed 
28 September 2011).   3 
 
The Japanese push south would eventually lead to a significant clash. This 
occurred in the Coral Sea. The Battle of the Coral Sea eventuated from the 
Japanese advance southwards and occurred between 4 and 8 May 1942. It was the 
Japanese intention to capture Port Moresby in Papua New Guinea; this was to be 
known as Operation MO. The battle provided an opportunity for the Allies to gain 
some confidence in a war which was quickly slipping away in the Pacific. It also 
allowed an opportunity for the Australian public to gain some relief, even for a 
short while, from the perceived threat of invasion.  
 
The Battle of the Coral Sea has been ranked as one of the most pivotal battles of 
the Second World War.
4
 
 It proved to be not only a battle which provided for the 
security of Australia; it also changed the way in which war would be fought at 
sea. This was an engagement in which surface ships did not sight each other or 
exchange direct fire. All the fighting was conducted between aircraft. The aircraft 
carrier would go on to play a vital role in the Pacific War. 
The success of the Battle of the Coral Sea must be examined in several ways. As 
with all battles, the victor must be acknowledged, but in the Coral Sea there was 
no decisive victor. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) can be considered the 
tactical victors, whilst the Allies without doubt won the strategic battle and took 
the impetus from the battle. Coral Sea enabled the Allies to hold back, if only 
                                                           
4 History Channel, “The Greatest Battles of World War II” 
http://www.historychannel.com.au/microsite/greatest-battles-of-ww2/?id=10 (accessed May 19, 2011).   4 
temporarily, the Japanese advance. There should be no assumption that the battle 
won the war, nor did this battle singlehandedly secure the freedom of Australia 
from a possible invasion. There should, however, be an acknowledgment of the 
battle’s role in providing a starting block from which the Allies could secure 
victory in the Pacific and also eradicate the possibility of an invasion, or at the 
least isolation, of Australia.  
 
There have been several books specifically written about the Battle of the Coral 
Sea, whilst it has also been mentioned in those written generally on the Pacific 
War. This should be no surprise. Neither the largest, nor most famous of the 
many battles which took place in the Pacific, Coral Sea played a significant role 
in the security of Australia and the overall victory of the Allies. Publications such 
as The Barrier and the Javelin and Naval Warfare 1919-1945 are of a general 
nature, but, both books provide considerable discussion of the Coral Sea 
engagement.
5 Other books, such as Action Stations Coral Sea: The Australian 
Commander’s Story, are devoted to the battle the people and events surrounding 
it.
6
 
  
The Battle of the Coral Sea was arguably the beginning of the end for the 
Japanese in the Pacific. The battle’s impact on the security of Australia and the 
                                                           
5 HP. Willmott, The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies February to June 1942, 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983). 
Malcolm Murfett, Naval Warfare 1919-1945: An operational history of the volatile war at sea, (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2009). 
6 Chris Coulthard-Clark, Action Stations Coral Sea: The Australian Commander’s Story, Sydney: Allen and 
Unwin, 1991.  
   5 
prevention of a possible invasion, or at the least, isolation, has not been discussed 
as in-depth as the battle itself. Yes, it has been dubbed the battle which saved 
Australia by several authors; however, there has been minimal detailed discussion 
of this, especially in recent times. The aim of this thesis is to discuss the role and 
the use of the Battle of the Coral Sea in relation to Australian security during 
World War Two.  
 
H.P. Willmott has noted that the Battle of the Coral Sea was a battle which the 
Japanese needed to win quickly and effectively if they were to be successful in 
the Pacific. The failure of the Japanese to secure Port Moresby through Operation 
MO led to their downfall at Midway. 
7
 
 This comparison and connection with the 
Battle of Midway is another way in which Willmott has discussed the battle. This 
analysis is an essential aspect of determining the Battle of the Coral Sea’s 
effectiveness in the war and in particular its impact on Australia in 1942 and 
beyond.  
There should be no doubt as to what impact the Japanese capture of Port Moresby 
would have had on the security of Australia. G. Hermon Gill asserts that the 
Japanese would have been able to operate “air bases to facilitate air operations 
against Australia”.
8
                                                           
7 Willmott, The Barrier and the Javelin, 518. 
 Such beliefs as this contribute to the importance of the battle. 
This book, however, does not solely deal with the battle or the consequences of it. 
Richard W. Bates of the Naval War College wrote in 1947 about a strategic and 
8 G. Hermon Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1942-1945. (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1968), 39.   6 
tactical analysis of the battle as well as noting the effect on Australia.
9
 
 Bates has 
provided an in-depth account of how and why the Coral Sea Battle came about 
but does not focus on the role of the battle in the eyes of Australians at the time. 
Many newspaper articles have been written regarding the battle and its 
implications. These were primarily written during the war and in the immediate 
years following. This range of articles discusses what the battle meant for 
Australia and its impact on the greater war. Titles such as “Coral Sea Battle: 
Complacency Danger” and “The sea battles which shaped history: Coral Sea and 
Midway” are examples of articles which show the importance of the battle. They 
also show that the battle was not the sole reason for safety in Australia.
10 These 
articles, written in 1942 and 1950 respectively, have become the exception rather 
than the norm. In 1992, The Australian  published an article regarding the 
possibility of an invasion, noting that Australia may not have come under a 
substantial threat of invasion had the battle turned out differently.
11
 
 This is an 
example of how opinions of the battle’s success have changed over time. The 
argument presented in The Australian renders the strategic success of the battle of 
little worth.  
                                                           
9 Richard W. Bates, The Battle of the Coral Sea, May 1 to May 11 Inclusive, 1942, Strategical and Tactical 
Analysis, (Newport: Naval War College, 1947). 
10 “Coral Sea Battle: Complacency Danger.” The Mercury, 27 May, 1942, http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-
article25924328 (accessed 26 August, 2011). 
“The sea battles which shaped history: Coral Sea and Midway.” The Courier-Mail, 25 October, 1950, 
http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article50046587 (accessed 3 October 2011). 
11 David Horner, “Salvation folklore overlooks Japanese disarray on attack”, The Australian, 2-3 May, 1992.   7 
Naval historian Samuel E. Morison has written extensively on naval operations in 
the Second World War. The Coral Sea battle has been written about in Morison’s 
volume four of History of United States Naval Operations in World War II as 
well as in another of his publications,  The Two-Ocean War.
12
 
  Although a 
comprehensive history of the battle,  these two publications fail to 
comprehensively cover the battle’s impact on any Japanese invasion attempt of 
Australia.  
The majority of publications which discuss the battle have only skimmed the 
surface in terms of talking about the effects of the Battle of the Coral Sea on the 
safety of Australia throughout the Second World War, preferring to discuss the 
role of larger battles. This is evident in Charles Bateson’s The War With Japan: A 
Concise History.
13
 
 The possibility of invasion is only briefly discussed, perhaps 
due to the fact that after the battle the  war continued and more battles were 
associated with the protection of Australia. Whilst the newspapers of the time 
associated the Coral Sea with salvation, as time progressed, new views were 
formed as to its importance. This has become evident in publications of the 
second half of the twentieth century as well as that of the twenty-first. The Coral 
Sea should, however, not be discounted as playing a vital role in the safety of 
Australia. 
                                                           
12 Samuel E. Morison, History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II Volume 4: Coral Sea, 
Midway and Submarine Actions May 1942 – August 1942, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1958). 
Samuel E. Morison, The Two Ocean War, (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1963). 
13 Charles Bateson, The War With Japan: A Concise History, (Sydney: Ure Smith Pty Ltd, 1968).   8 
Although historians and other commentators have noted the impact of the Battle 
of the Coral Sea on a potential Japanese invasion of Australia, the majority of 
work is centred on the battle itself. From wartime publications which stated it was 
a saviour through to modern times when it has been viewed as less significant, the 
battle has had substantial public coverage. Additional resources are required to 
assess the role of the battle in maintaining security and stability of the Australian 
mainland during not only 1942, but also the remainder of the war.  
 
No one battle can claim to win a war; each battle is significant in winning a war. 
The Battle of the Coral Sea cannot claim to be an exception, nor can it be seen as 
the sole saviour of Australia. It can, however, be considered as a stepping stone in 
the ultimate security of Australia during the war. It must be noted that other 
battles such as Midway, Guadalcanal and Kokoda also played a large part in 
Australia’s security. At this same time, it must be acknowledged that the victories 
which took place in those locations may not have been possible if Coral Sea was 
not first a success. The success of Coral Sea allowed the Allies to gain confidence 
and work towards victory at Midway, whilst also giving confidence to other 
military units in land battles at Kokoda and Guadalcanal. If any of these battles 
were unsuccessful, then the security of Australia might once again have been in 
jeopardy and the achievements of the Battle of the Coral Sea would have been 
undermined. 
 
In saying this, the role which the battle played in Australian history, particularly 
its security during the war, must be examined. The government response, its   9 
comparison with the Battle of Midway, and the way in which the Coral Sea 
engagement has been memorialised and remembered are all critical in 
determining this. These three topics help explain how the battle shaped the course 
of the war with regard to Australia.  
 
It could be said that the battle was a strategic victory of convenience. The battle 
was  what the Australian public needed in early 1942 as the future had been 
looking bleak due to the increasing Japanese expansion. The battle enabled Prime 
Minister John Curtin to rally the public much like British PM Winston Churchill 
did during the Battle of Britain. It provided positive news from which Curtin 
could inform the public to remain vigilant, as the war could now take a positive 
direction.  
 
The battle also introduced Australians to the power of the American military. US 
troops and sailors remained based in Australia as they continued to fight across 
the South Pacific. This relationship continued to grow throughout the war and 
also in the years after. In today’s society, Americans are thanked for their 
involvement in the protection of Australia throughout the war. The relationship of 
the two nations has resulted in such treaties as ANZUS and the formation of the 
Australian-American Association. This has provided another aspect as to why the 
battle was significant.  
   10 
It should be noted that the Battle of the Coral Sea was not a decisive victory in 
terms of securing Australia’s safety, as many battles that followed also played a 
vital role in this. The Australian government even introduced conscription well 
after the end of the Coral Sea. This decision must be seen in conjunction with the 
Coral Sea and its effective nature in preventing an invasion of Australia as was 
reported at the time. The government decision to change legislation to allow 
conscripts to fight overseas in a specified area close to Australia arguably shows 
that the battle was not as definitive as once believed.  
 
This thesis analyses the perception of the battle and the way in which it affected 
any potential Japanese attempt at invasion or isolation. The government response 
and thoughts on the battle through to its link to Midway and how it has been 
commemorated in the years since are all pivotal in recognising its impact. The 
Battle of the Coral Sea is not only an important piece of military history but also 
Australian history. It should be remembered not as the battle which saved 
Australia, but rather a battle which shaped battles yet to come, giving the Allies 
confidence after months of devastating defeats. The Battle of the Coral Sea 
should be seen as a stepping stone to victory in the Pacific and the safety and 
security of Australia.  
 
 
 
   11 
Chapter 1 
Hands to Action Stations: New Generation Warfare 
 
In May 1942, the Japanese pushed south towards Papua New Guinea in an 
attempt to capture Port Moresby. As a strategically placed city, Port Moresby 
would enable them to control the Coral Sea and ultimately cut the supply and 
communication lines between Australia and the United States. This amphibious 
assault was to be known as Operation MO. The United States were yet to assert 
themselves in a dominant and offensive manner in the Pacific. The Japanese were 
beginning to feel that they could gain further control of the Asia-Pacific region 
relatively unhindered. The Battle of the Coral Sea became pivotal in the course of 
the Pacific War, as the first encounter between the Japanese and Allied forces in 
which the Japanese did not achieve a decisive victory. 
 
The Battle of the Coral Sea resulted from this Japanese push south and Operation 
MO, the attempt to take Port Moresby by an amphibious assault. It was, as the US 
Naval War College said in 1947, an inevitable result of the Japanese thirst for 
southward expansion, and the United States’ wish to prevent such an advance. 
Japanese success would hamper America’s coalition with Australia and prevent 
strategic bases in the region being utilised.
14
                                                           
14 Richard W. Bates, The Battle of the Coral Sea, May 1 to May 11 Inclusive, 1942, Strategical and Tactical 
Analysis, (Newport: Naval War College, 1947), 1. 
 The battle took place between 4 and 
8 May 1942, with most of the action taking place on 7 and 8 May. If the Japanese   12 
were able to capture Port Moresby, they would have been able to control the 
Coral Sea and many of the surrounding islands, disrupting the supply and 
communication lines between Australia and the United States.  
 
Many theories have been put forth, both contemporaneously and later, about the 
Japanese intentions concerning Australia. Alleged policies such as the Brisbane 
Line  have  created  arguments over the Australian government’s thoughts on a 
Japanese invasion.
15 It can be presumed that even if an invasion was not planned, 
the isolation of Australia might have the same effect as an invasion. Malcolm 
Murfett, however, suggests that an invasion of Australia was ruled out due to the 
Japanese plan to take Midway. Port Moresby, coming under Japanese control, 
would have sufficiently satisfied them, as they would have been able to control 
the shipping lanes between Australia and the Solomon Islands, as well as the 
shipping lanes between Australia and the United States.
16
 
  They would have 
effectively nullified the US presence in the region due to Australian bases not 
being available. 
The battle has been described as one which was definitive in the region, but it is 
also known as one which was riddled with mistakes by both sides. According to 
naval historian Samuel E. Morison, “The ensuing action was full of mistakes, 
both humorous and tragic, wrong estimates and assumptions, bombing the wrong 
                                                           
15 Australian War Memorial. “Brisbane Line”, 
http://www.awm.gov.au/encyclopedia/homefront/brisbane_line.asp (accessed 23 March, 2011). 
16 Malcolm Murfett, Naval Warfare 1919-1945: An operational history of the volatile war at sea, (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2009), 176.   13 
ships, missing great opportunities and cashing in accidently on minor ones”.
17
 
 
The high number of mistakes could be due to the fact that a new type of naval 
warfare was introduced at the battle. The entire battle was fought by carrier 
aircraft, without a ship ever sighting an enemy vessel. Aircraft from both sides 
were equipped with bombs and torpedoes.  
The Japanese arguably did not plan a sufficient force of both men and resources 
for a task which was to cover such a large geographic area. The operation did not 
just aim to take Port Moresby, but also to establish air bases in the Solomon 
Islands. This would enable the Japanese to control a complete chain of islands. 
The Americans had already suffered dismal losses since their entry into the war, 
however, they were beginning to claw their way back. The recent bombings of 
Tokyo in April, known as the Doolittle Raid, had unsettled the Japanese, and as 
became apparent, these bombings played a significant role in the Battle of the 
Coral Sea.
18
 
 The Japanese had underestimated the Allied force present, since they 
believed much of the fleet would be returning to Pearl Harbor after the attacks on 
the Japanese mainland.  
As H.P. Willmott states, “The Japanese determination to secure Port Moresby and 
the equally strong American determination to prevent their doing so produced the 
first major fleet action”.
19
                                                           
17 Samuel E. Morison, The Two Ocean War, (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1963), 142. 
 This battle’s significance was not limited to it being the 
18 Murfett, Naval Warfare 1919-1945, 176. 
19 H.P. Willmott, The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies February to June 1942, 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983), 203.   14 
first in which enemy ships never sighted each other while the fighting was done 
by carrier aircraft. It has been pointed out that the Japanese were known for the 
over complication of their plans, and Operation MO was no different. The 
Japanese had decided that advance air bases would be needed in the South Pacific 
to ensure they gained complete control of the Solomon Islands. Due to this, the 
capture of the islands of Santa Isabel and Tulagi in the Solomons were added to 
the operation. After learning of an imminent Japanese advance in the region, US 
Admiral Chester Nimitz was adamant not to let the chance of striking a blow to 
the Japanese slip away. The Americans were keen to cause a major disruption for 
the Japanese for the first time since the attack on Pearl Harbor months earlier. 
Three Allied naval task forces were ordered to the Coral Sea; these were to be 
under the overall command of Admiral Frank J. Fletcher.
 20
 
 
The battle involved three Allied naval task forces: Task Force 11 based around 
the aircraft carrier USS Lexington,  Task Force 17 which contained the USS 
Yorktown and Task Force 44 comprised of destroyers and cruisers including the 
Australian ships Australia and Hobart. These task forces were ordered to ensure 
the Japanese were not able to capitalise on their recent victories. Allied code 
breakers had received intelligence suggesting  that the Japanese were moving 
south in the general vicinity of the Coral Sea, but  were unclear of the exact 
Japanese intentions.
21
                                                           
20 Murfett, Naval Warfare 1919-1945, 177. 
 The breaking of the Japanese code used by the IJN was an 
21 Willmott, The Barrier and the Javelin , 204.   15 
essential part of not only the Battle of the Coral Sea, but indeed of the entire 
Pacific War.
22
 
  
Task Forces 11 and 17 were to rendezvous on 1 May, 250 miles from Espirito 
Santo, Vanuatu. Meanwhile Task Force 44 was steaming north after leaving 
Sydney the same day. Task Force 44 was redesignated Task Force 17.3 for the 
duration of the battle. Commanded by Rear Admiral Crace, TF 17.3 did not reach 
the Coral Sea and meet up with TF 11 and 17 until 4 May. Meanwhile, according 
to Willmott, a Dauntless aircraft antisubmarine patrol launched from Task Force 
17 spotted the I-21 Japanese submarine on 2 May, just thirty-two miles from the 
Yorktown. As a result of this sighting, Fletcher decided to move further west, to 
avoid the I-21 and gain a position behind the Japanese force coming from the 
north.
23
 
  
The Japanese invasion force involving the carriers Zuikaku and Shokaku were in a 
hurry to complete Operation MO, and sail north  for the offensive against 
Midway,  planned to begin on 1 June.
24  This  rush and the perceived over-
complication of the operation could be seen as a weakness in the Japanese 
operation. It ultimately dampened the result at not only the Coral Sea  where 
“even as it began, Japan’s tightly scheduled naval operation started falling apart”, 
but also at Midway the following month.
25
                                                           
22 Ibid, 177. 
 Costello remarks that the Japanese 
23 Ibid, 205-6. 
24 John Costello, The Pacific War, (London: William Collins and Co. Ltd, 1981), 251. 
25 Ibid, 253.   16 
were guilty of underestimating the American force present in the area. They 
believed that the Lexington had previously been sunk by a submarine in January 
and that the carriers which had recently taken part in the Doolittle Raid would be 
on their way back to Hawaii.
26
 
  
On 3 May, the Japanese 3rd Kure Special Landing Force began the invasion of 
Tulagi. Fletcher decided it was best to launch an airstrike against Tulagi and the 
invasion force. This was not possible, however, until 4 May, due to the position 
of the task forces. Murfett purports that this mission was somewhat a waste of 
time and fuel, as the Japanese Special Forces had already landed and the ships 
they travelled on had moved out to sea.
27 Costello notes that Fletcher may have in 
fact sent exaggerated reports on the numbers of warships sunk to Pearl Harbor as 
a result of inflated figures sent back by pilots which were involved in the attack 
on the invasion force.
28
 
 Following this disappointing action by the American fleet 
Fletcher decided to head back to join the other task forces which were 300 
nautical miles south of Guadalcanal. 
                                                           
26 Ibid, 251. 
27 Murfett, Naval Warfare 1919-1945, 177-8. 
28 Costello, The Pacific War, 253.   17 
 
Map 1: Situation at 0800 on 4 May
29
 
 
As the Japanese steamed towards Port Moresby they faced a new problem on how 
to neutralise the Allied air supremacy in the area. Not only was the air space 
above Port Moresby controlled by the Allies, but the Allies also had the 
advantage of aircraft based in nearby Northern Australia. These forces “would 
still be able to strike at any Japanese force in the western Coral Sea”.
30 Willmott 
argues that the Japanese attempted Operation MO, which covered a great area, 
with too few resources. This amounted to “an overall failure of strategic 
policy”.
31
                                                           
29 Willmott, The Barrier and the Javelin , 228. 
 The Japanese had attempted a raid on Port Moresby on 25 April; this 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid, 210.   18 
raid  caused some heavy damage to the city, but the Japanese also suffered 
losses.
32
 
  
As the Allied task forces and the Japanese invasion force continued steaming into 
the Coral Sea on 6 May, it was the weather which caused the most havoc. If it had 
not been for this terrible weather, the Battle of the Coral Sea might have turned 
out entirely different, with a more traditional naval battle taking place. Although 
the enemy forces were only 70 nautical miles apart at certain times, the fleets still 
remained out of sight of each other due to the poor visibility caused by the 
weather.
33
 
  
On the evening of 6 May, Fletcher decided to send the tanker Neosho, which was 
low on fuel, on its way. It was escorted by the destroyer Sims. On the morning of 
7 May, Rear-Admiral Chuichi Hara, who was the commander of the Japanese 
Carrier Striking Force, decided to head south once again for further aerial 
surveillance.  This proved to be crucial. Reports came through that an enemy 
carrier and cruiser had been spotted. In fact, they had discovered the Neosho and 
Sims. Seventy-eight planes were launched and headed directly for the two ships, 
which were now forced to fight on by themselves. They were no match for the 
Japanese aircraft which disabled the Neosho and sank the Sims.
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the Japanese suffered the loss of six aircraft. According to G. Hermon Gill, they 
also missed the opportunity to attack Fletcher, who was 270 miles to the WNW.
35
 
 
Meanwhile, a Japanese reconnaissance plane had also spotted Crace’s TF 17.3, 
which consisted of three destroyers and three cruisers. The bombings of TF 17.3 
began earlier than Crace or his men anticipated, but not from Japanese aircraft. 
An American fleet of B-26 bombers mistook his task force for the invasion force 
headed for Port Moresby. It was only Crace’s ability and experience as a capable 
naval officer, and that of his captains on board the other ships, which averted a 
complete disaster. Many of the ships came very close to tragedy according to 
Murfett. Crace and the captains of the ships under his command were able to 
successfully steer clear of the bombers.
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Map 1.1: Situation at 0800 on 7 May
37
 
 
At  0815, 7 May, Allied aerial reconnaissance spotted Japanese ships 
approximately 235nm northwest of Fletcher and his task force. Again, the report 
on the type and number of ships was wrong. Fletcher was under the impression 
that he had found the carrier striking force. Fletcher quickly set about preparing 
both the Lexington and Yorktown for launching aircraft, ninety-three in total, to 
search for and attack the carrier striking force. What Fletcher did not realise was 
that the force spotted was merely the support force of Rear Admiral Kuninori 
Marumo. This Force consisted of two old light cruisers, three gunboats and an 
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aircraft depot ship, although it was reported as being four cruisers and two aircraft 
carriers.
38
 
 This is why it was first reported as being a striking force. 
Lieutenant Commander W.L. Hamilton, in a scout plane, spotted the light carrier 
Shoho. Soon the Shoho  had ninety-three planes on top of her. According to 
Morison, “No ship could have survived such a concentration. After receiving two 
1000-pound bomb hits, she burst into flames and went dead in the water”.
39 The 
Shoho lost three quarters of its aircraft, with 638 Japanese sailors and airmen 
killed.
40 Five minutes after abandon ship was ordered at 1131, she gave way to 
the sea and sank. Across the radio came the voice of Lieutenant Commander R. 
E. Dixon, “Scratch one flattop! Dixon to Carrier, Scratch one flattop!”
41 This 
ended the first attack on an enemy aircraft carrier by planes launched from an 
American carrier. During the course of the Pacific campaign, eleven more 
Japanese carriers would be sunk by Allied planes launched from carriers. 
Although sinking a Japanese carrier was a great result for the American forces, 
the outcome was not as great as it could have been. With so many aircraft 
airborne, and several other Japanese ships in the vicinity, the Americans were 
somewhat disappointed that only one light carrier was sunk on the day.
42
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Fletcher experienced a great deal of what could be called luck throughout the 
ensuing battle. His planes had not yet found the Shokaku and Zuikaku, however, 
at 1022 hours on 7 May, bombers stumbled upon the Japanese covering force in 
the vicinity of Misima Island.
43 Meanwhile, Crace and his supporting force had 
been sent to destroy ships passing through the Jomard Passage which connects the 
Coral Sea to the Solomon Sea.
44 While at the Jomard Passage, Crace’s force 
came under fire from Japanese aircraft. Crace did not have the luxury of fighter 
protection, a situation which had recently cost Allied ships in the region. Both the 
British warships HMS Prince of Wales  and  Repulse  had been sunk just six 
months earlier off the coast of Malaya by Japanese bombers. As Willmott 
described, Crace “and his force had no idea what was happening around them, 
and Crace was unable to drum up air support from Australia while operating 
within range of enemy aircraft from Rabaul”.
45
 
  
Crace tried to provide as small a target as possible for the aircraft by facing his 
ships directly at them. All torpedoes which were launched from these aircraft 
missed their targets. Two more waves of attack by high-level bombers followed. 
The last of these was by American bombers. Fortunately for Crace and his men 
this bombing was not effective.
46 It is said that Crace reported to General Brett 
after the battle that, “fortunately their bombing, in comparison with that of the 
Japanese formation minutes earlier, was disgraceful”.
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Map 1.2: Situation at 1600 on 7 May
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An RAN publication has noted that if Fletcher had not decided to send Crace to 
the Jomard Passage, that the Japanese would have had an unopposed run to Port 
Moresby. The presence of these warships prevented Admiral Inouye’s invasion 
force to continue to Port Moresby. The Admiral felt it was best to wait until the 
situation with Crace had been clarified.
49 This was a major victory for the Allies. 
As  Morison explains, “The Japanese retreat had begun, although nobody yet 
admitted the fact”.
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mistook the Yorktown for one of their own ships and attempted to land on it. Both 
sides decided not to risk any further loses with a night time engagement.
51
 
 
Willmott suggests that following the sinking of the Shoho, the American and 
other Allied forces were in a position to pick their battles. The Japanese, however, 
now on the retreat, had to force the issue. Their task was made more difficult after 
not only losing a carrier, but also having their route to Port Moresby blocked by 
the Allied task force at the Jomard Passage.
52 A new battle began 8 May. In this 
case, the Allies had less protection for their carriers than the previous few days. 
Crace’s force was still dispatched, leaving the Yorktown and Lexington somewhat 
vulnerable with only seven destroyers and five heavy cruisers to protect the two 
carriers.
53
 
 The luck of the day seemed to be with the Japanese. The IJN carriers 
had been working together for many months, while the Lexington and Yorktown 
had only recently joined forces and had little tactical experience with one another. 
The weather also cleared around the Allied forces, which was in favour of the 
Japanese since the Allied carriers could be spotted more easily.  
On the morning of 8
 May, both sides began sending out planes to search for the 
enemy. Both sides spotted each other at approximately 0815. Once the Japanese 
were spotted, Fletcher felt it best to hand over tactical command to Admiral Fitch, 
who had superior experience with the operations of aircraft carriers.
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War. It is evident from Willmott that the losses that the Japanese suffered became 
pivotal in the following months, especially at Midway. “Losses incurred on the 
eighth cost the Japanese not only their chance to bring Operation MO to a 
successful conclusion but their margin of superiority at Midway”.
55
 
 The battle, 
which began as an opportunity for the Americans to restore some sort of balance 
of power in the Pacific, ended with not only this balance, but also gave the 
Americans the advantage.  
Map 1.3: Situation at 0800 on 8 May
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At 0915 a thirty-nine plane strike force set off from Yorktown and discovered the 
Shokaku and Zuikaku an hour and three quarters later. They were heading towards 
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the south east and were being screened by two destroyers and heavy cruisers. The 
weather once again came into play, with the Zuikaku heading into a squall of 
tropical rain, while the Shokaku  launched further fighters. It was a different 
scenario than the sinking of the Shoho the previous day, when the weight of 
numbers the Americans had in the sky was compared with one light cruiser.  
 
The coordination of the American pilots was not as impressive. Torpedoes missed 
their targets, as did other bombs; only two hits were recorded, causing damage 
only to the Shokaku’s flight deck.
57 There were, however, terrific feats in this 
sortie. Lieutenant John Powers found the target on his raid. Although Powers died 
on this raid, his 1,000 pound bomb struck the Shokaku from a height of only 200 
feet.
58 This caused aviation gas to ignite, which looked more threatening than it 
was.
59 These two hits on Shokaku were far from exceptional for the American 
forces, due to the number of sorties flown. They prevented the Shokaku from 
being fully operational. The carrier was no longer able to launch any further 
planes, but only able to land planes on the deck. Many of these planes were 
transferred to the Zuikaku, after another hit was recorded by planes from the 
Lexington, which had finally found the carriers after flying off track earlier in the 
morning. Shokaku was now to end her contribution at the battle and at 1300 made 
way for home. By this time it was believed by Admiral Takagi that both 
American carriers had been sunk.
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heavy attack from the Japanese carrier born aircraft. Before the day was out, both 
sides claimed victory, yet for very different reasons.  
 
The USS Lexington, an integral part of the United States Navy, did not survive 
the Battle of the Coral Sea. Two Kate bombers struck her port side with torpedoes 
at 1120.
61 The attack on the Lexington began furiously. While American pilots 
had been attacking the Shokaku, Japanese aircraft attacked the Lexington. When 
the American pilots returned to their vessel, they found that the Japanese had 
been more successful in their raid, severely damaging the Lexington. The reason 
why the Lexington was so badly damaged could, in part, be due to the fact that the 
aircraft tasked with defending her were unable to effectively carry out their 
mission. Part of the Combat Air Patrol was too low on fuel to be sent out to 
intercept the enemy. While failing to find the enemy, pilots failed to gain enough 
altitude to intercept and were  overwhelmed by Zero fighters.
62
 
  The  Japanese 
pilots hurtling in towards the Lexington  hit it with more precision than the 
Americans had been able to against the Japanese carriers. Hit in the port bow by 
two fast running torpedoes, three boiler rooms flooded.  
These were not the only hits that the Lexington sustained. Two bombs also hit 
her, although causing only minimal damage. Damage was further caused by near-
miss bombs, which shattered plates.
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 The size of the carrier did not allow it to 
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Frederick C. Sherman, the 40,000 tons of steel did not respond in time. After the 
hits, some of the crew believed they were sinking. Lieutenant C. M. Williams 
remarked “we thought we were sinking”, as a foot of oil and water was covering a 
battery on the port side.
64  With the siren screeching  the ship began  to list 7 
degrees to port.
65
 
 The Lexington was not the only Allied ship attacked on 8 May. 
The USS Yorktown also came under fire from Japanese aircraft. The Yorktown 
had an advantage over her fellow carrier, though, in that it was smaller and more 
manoeuvrable.  
Figure 1: Lexington being abandoned.
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Due to Yorktown’s superior agility she was able to dodge many of the torpedoes 
and bombs which were fired. Only one direct hit was recorded, an 800-pound 
bomb which struck the flight deck. This bomb penetrated through to the fourth 
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deck,  with sixty-six men killed or injured. As Morison explains, high credit 
should be given to Captain Buckmaster for his expert handling of the aircraft 
carrier.
67
 
 Yorktown was also hurt after Commander Ault, the leader of the dive-
bombing strike, was lost at sea. Running low on fuel, with his ship and land out 
of sight, he radioed Yorktown  to keep an eye out for him. His men had 
successfully disabled the Shokaku, but this was the last time Commander Ault 
was heard from.  
With the Japanese strike group more effective than that of the Americans, the 
Allies could regard themselves as lucky to have escaped without more damage. 
This gave them the vital edge they required the following month at Midway. The 
Yorktown suffered considerable damage on 8 May, but was fixed in time for her 
to sail to Midway.  
 
Due to the dramatic movements of both the Lexington and the Yorktown, their 
destroyer and cruiser escorts were not able to maintain their formation. It has 
been claimed that the Japanese were only after the American carriers, and felt that 
they had accomplished their mission.
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which had so proudly served the US Navy was unable to be saved. Captain 
Sherman was the last to leave, after ice-cream had been scooped into steel 
helmets and Wags, the captain’s dog, had been transferred to another ship. The 
destroyer USS Phelps  was ordered to fire two torpedoes into the Lexington, 
ending her participation in the war.
69
 
  
Admiral Yamamoto ordered Takagi to sail deeper into the Coral Sea at midnight 
on 8 May. They searched unsuccessfully for the Allied fleet for thirty-six hours. 
As Murfett purports, had these orders been carried out the previous day, the 
Battle of the Coral Sea could have become a complete disaster for the Allies.
70
 
  
This concluded the first aircraft carrier battle in history. During the battle, the 
Japanese losses included 77 aircraft, 1074 men and the Shoho, a 12,000-ton 
carrier, while the United States losses included the USS Lexington, a 42,000-ton 
aircraft carrier, 543 men and 66 aircraft. The entire significance of the battle 
would not necessarily be seen until the following month at Midway. The 
prevention of the Japanese amphibious attack on Port Moresby was a significant 
success for the United States and her Allies. It was seen in Australia as a great 
victory and at least a momentary relief from the fear of an invasion. In terms of a 
naval battle, victory could be credited to the Imperial Japanese Navy. They were 
more successful in terms of ships sunk. They were, however, unaware that the 
Yorktown had not been sunk and would participate at Midway. The disabling of 
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the  Shokaku  proved  pivotal over the next month. The Americans  rushed  the 
Yorktown back to Hawaii for emergency repairs. This was conducted within the 
astonishingly short time of three days. She was then ready to sail to Midway, 
which unfortunately proved to be her last action.
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Chapter 2 
Fighting Spirit: The Australian Response 
 
The Battle of the Coral Sea provided a unique opportunity for Allied forces to 
gain their first victory against the Japanese after a series of devastating and 
demoralising defeats throughout the Asia-Pacific region. With tensions running 
high in Australia regarding the possibility of a Japanese invasion, it was vital that 
the Allied forces provided a new sense of optimism and safety. It was equally 
important that the Allied governments were able to give their people positive 
news regarding the war effort. Further battles were to come in the war, which 
along with the Coral Sea prevented the Japanese succeeding in the Pacific. It was 
the job of the Australian government to change legislation and send further 
Australian troops to locations in the Pacific region to capitalise on the 
achievement in the Coral Sea. It can be argued that some of these changes may 
not have been necessary if the Battle of the Coral Sea was the sole source of 
Australia’s security in 1942 and for the remainder of the war.  
 
Regardless of any Japanese intentions, it must be recognised that Australia was in 
a dire situation in 1942. In regard to the security of Australia, it can be argued that 
an invasion may not have been necessary for the Japanese to remove Australia’s 
presence from the war and inflict further problems on the United States. If 
Operation MO had been a Japanese success, they would have been able to control 
the shipping lanes in the Southern Asia and South Pacific areas, effectively   33 
cutting the communication and supply lines between Australia and the US, 
nullifying the use of Australian bases by the US military. It can be seen with 
hindsight that the Battle of the Coral Sea was not the battle that saved Australia 
from an invasion, which may have initially been believed, nor did it stop the 
attacks against the Australian mainland.
72
 
 However, it can be argued that the 
battle did stem the flow of the war, enabling the Allies to gain control in the 
Pacific and in turn save not only Australia, but possibly the United States from a 
humiliating defeat.   
The Australian Government was in a difficult position in 1942, with the bulk of 
Australia’s military personnel fighting overseas with British forces. It was the job 
of the Prime Minister, John Curtin, to ensure that the strategic victory in the Coral 
Sea was used to the fullest. This was done through many policies and decisions 
made in the aftermath of the battle.  
 
In May 1942, John Curtin gained the public’s attention by stating that a “great 
naval battle is proceeding in the South-west Pacific zone”.
73  Prime  Minister 
Curtin went on to say in his famous speech that “this battle will not decide the 
war; it will determine the immediate tactics which will be pursued by the Allied 
forces and by the common enemy”.
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however, a considerable stepping stone to the eventual downfall of Japan. The US 
Navy was required to consolidate the gains acquired in the Coral Sea by defeating 
the Japanese at Midway the following month. If Midway had not been a success, 
the success achieved by the men who fought in the Coral Sea may well have been 
negated.  
 
Curtin’s news about a battle taking place in the Coral Sea was delivered in a 
speech to Parliament on Friday, 8 May 1942, the last day of the battle which had 
begun four days earlier. The Battle of the Coral Sea enabled the Australian 
government to reassure the Australian people and motivate them to keep fighting, 
whether they were currently serving as troops or contributing to the war effort on 
the home front. The future now looked brighter. It has been reported that Curtin 
exaggerated the possibility of a Japanese invasion.
75 Nevertheless, Curtin’s stance 
may have been necessary to keep the Australian people from becoming 
complacent. Curtin had struggled with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill 
over the return of Australian troops to support the defence of Australia.
76
 
 It may 
be argued that Curtin used all possible initiatives to ensure there would be enough 
men to secure the nation should Japan launch an invasion attempt. 
Curtin maintained that the danger to Australia would not be over until the 
Japanese Imperial Forces had been completely defeated. As reported in the 
Barrier Miner on 24 July 1942, “The menace to Australia is constant. It will not 
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disappear until the Japs have been defeated”.
77
 
 From statements such as this it can 
be seen that the government did not view the Battle of the Coral Sea as the end of 
Japanese aggression nor did they perceive that there was no longer a Japanese 
threat to the Australian mainland. After a series of Japanese advances in South-
East Asia and the Pacific it was decided that Australian troops would now be sent 
overseas to once again counter the Japanese threat.  
This decision was based just as much on events that had taken place earlier in the 
Pacific as on the need for continued defence after the Battle of the Coral Sea. 
Earlier in 1942, with Asia and the Pacific under severe threat from Japan, the 
future of Australia looked bleak. The British had lost Singapore, and two of their 
most powerful vessels in the navy, Prince of Wales and Repulse, had been sunk in 
Asian waters. Following the attacks on Pearl Harbor, Australia had turned to 
America for defence. Britain was tied up in Europe fighting Nazi Germany and 
was reluctant to move further military assets to the Asian region. With the 
Americans now involved in the war, Prime Minister Curtin gave one of the most 
famous speeches in Australian history. He stated, “Without any inhibitions of any 
kind I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free from any pangs as 
to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom”.
78
 
 Australia needed 
help defending itself from the rapidly advancing Japanese; the United States was 
to provide this support.  
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Even before Japan entered the war, their aggression in the Pacific began to alarm 
the Australian government. At the beginning of December 1941, the War Cabinet 
held a meeting regarding the belligerence of Japan, which was a growing 
concern.
79  In the coming months the Dutch East Indies, Singapore and other 
islands became property of the Japanese. Only Papua New Guinea was left for the 
Allies to defend before Australia looked to become Japan’s next victim. HMAS 
Perth and USS Houston were sunk in the Battle of the Sunda Strait in February 
1942, leaving Australia more vulnerable to attack. Earlier that month Darwin had 
already felt the brunt of Japanese aircraft. The Australian Government had the 
tough job of rallying the Australian people to fight, whether by joining the 
military or helping in the war effort at home. According to Black and Wallace, 
“as the months went by Curtin’s task increasingly became one of sustaining the 
total war effort in the face of ‘growing public complacency’”.
80
 
 The Battle of the 
Coral  Sea produced an opportunity for the government to encourage the 
Australian people after such a bleak opening to 1942. 
The victory in the Coral Sea was not enough. Two months after the Battle of the 
Coral Sea, the invasion of Papua New Guinea meant that all Australians were 
required to continue working hard to ensure that the Japanese were not able to 
accomplish their mission of capturing Port Moresby, this time by land. Prime 
Minister Curtin then went on to say, “we have had breathing space, and that is all 
we could have expected”, referring to the battles that took place in the Coral Sea 
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and at Midway.
81 Curtin also reiterated that war was an ongoing struggle and 
would not be resolved until Japan had been completely defeated.
82
 
 The Battle of 
the Coral Sea did not stop the Japanese advance, nor did it deter them from trying 
once again to take Port Moresby. It did, however, signal the beginning of the end 
for them and provide the Australian government and the Australian people with 
some confidence. Due to the success of the US Navy at Midway the following 
month, they now gained the naval ascendancy in the Pacific. Although it would 
still take three years for the Japanese to be completely defeated, there was a new 
sense of optimism throughout the Allied nations. This optimism now needed to be 
consolidated. 
In contrast to this optimism, the Advisory War Council had been dissapointed 
that Japanese losses in the Coral Sea had not been more significant. They also 
expressed their dissatisfaction that more land-based aircraft were not stationed in 
north-east Australia.
83
 
 These views went against those of General MacArthur, 
who believed the  efforts of the Allies had produced a more than satisfactory 
result. It is arguable that little more could have been achieved in the Coral Sea, 
and with hindsight the quick-fire successes at the Coral Sea and Midway allowed 
the Allies to build confidence.  
In July 1942, there was yet another attempt by the Japanese to take Port Moresby, 
this time by land. If the Battle of the Coral Sea had in fact saved Australia as it has 
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been claimed, these battles and the troop numbers sent may not have been 
necessary. This suggests that the impact of the Coral Sea action and the relief it 
initiated within Australia was only felt for a short period. 
 
MacArthur felt that Britain’s decision  to only offer assistance to Australia if 
under heavy attack was not acceptable, and asked Prime Minister Curtin to make 
provisions for the return of the 9
th Division. Sydney had come under attack from 
midget submarines on 31 May.
84
 
  It  now became evident that Japan was not 
contemplating a reduction in their attacks against the Australian mainland.  
In spite of continued Japanese threats, the Battle of the Coral Sea acted as the 
catalyst for a series of victories throughout the Pacific, including Guadalcanal, 
one of the war’s most famous campaigns. After months of disastrous campaigns, 
the Allies were now capable of launching offensive attacks against the Japanese. 
It was reported in Washington on 8 May that the policy of taking an offensive 
strategy against Japan had now become a reality.
85 It was not until September 
1943 that John Curtin announced that the threat of invasion had passed. He 
emphasized that it was still vital to fight, as victory was now in sight.
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By 1943, as the Allies were starting to gain further control in the Pacific, it 
became evident that the major battles were taking place in areas further from the 
Australian mainland. The Australian government introduced changes to the laws 
surrounding conscription. For the first time conscripted men would be legally 
allowed to fight overseas, although in a limited area. Curtin believed that these 
troops should be able to be sent overseas to counter the Japanese. It was possible 
for Curtin to implement this change to the Defence Act, but he decided against 
this. It went to Parliament for debate. There was little opposition to the proposed 
decision. Subsequently, the Defence Act  of  1943 was approved by the War 
Cabinet.
87 This stated that Australian conscripts could now fight in the South-
West Pacific Zone for the remainder of the war. The Act would cease six months 
following the end of any hostilities.
 88
 
 
Curtin, when in the opposition party at the outbreak of war, had expressed his 
disapproval of conscripting men to fight overseas. These views changed as 
Australia received little assistance from Britain, who used many Australian 
service personnel in the fight against the Axis Powers in the Middle East and 
North Africa. On 29 April 1942, with Curtin now in power, the opposition leader, 
Mr Fadden stated that: 
in the order that the Australian Imperial Force and the 
Australian Military Forces may be effectively welded into 
one fighting army available for offence as well as defence, 
this House is of opinion that all territorial limitations upon 
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the power of the Commonwealth Government to employ 
the Australian Military Forces should be removed.
89
 
 
David Day reports that in early 1942 Britain assumed that the cities of Darwin and 
Perth would be invaded by Japanese troops. They did not feel the need to send any 
personnel to increase security as they did not believe that the south-east seaboard, 
home to the major cities of Sydney and Melbourne, was in any danger.
90 In the 
following months, the Battle of the Coral Sea appeared to nullify any immediate 
threats of an invasion of Northern Australia. However, the fear of air raids 
remained for the foreseeable future.
91 The fear of Japanese invasion in 1942 was 
also felt in the southern portions of Australia. According to one account, 
explosives and depth charges were rigged in Fremantle Harbour to prevent its use 
by the Japanese in the event of an invasion.
92
 
  
From this, it can be seen that Curtin was in the unenviable position of sending 
troops overseas to increase the defensive perimeter, while  also pushing the 
Japanese back in an offensive thrust. Many restrictions were introduced in 
Australia, as in many other nations throughout the war, such as censorship to 
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prevent widespread panic, rationing and the encouragement of civilians to join 
volunteer organisations helping the war effort.
93
 
 
In the event of invasion, a plan to allow the Japanese to occupy the northern parts 
of Australia, while only defending the south eastern part of Australia where the 
majority of the population and industry was located, has become known as the 
Brisbane Line. The validity of any such plan may have come under scrutiny if 
indeed it was implemented. As Lord Strabolgi, Royal Navy, notes, if the Japanese 
had invaded Australia, the vast desert separating northern and southern Australia 
may have prevented them wanting to progress south. Instead they might have 
been inclined to defend their northern occupation at places such as Darwin. Along 
with any occupation they may have had in New Guinea, this would have been 
able to prevent the northern passage to the Indian Ocean being accessed by the 
Allies.
94
 
 In this case, the Brisbane Line would have been ineffective. The main 
cities may have remained safe, but little would have been accomplished from 
such a position. The Japanese would have been able to control the Arafura Sea 
and prevent any supply between Australia and Papua New Guinea. 
As the Brisbane Line has never been confirmed as official policy, it is the topic of 
much debate in Australia. The Government felt that the most important areas to 
secure were those with the majority of industry and population.
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defence capabilities of many northern cities including Darwin and Cairns, much 
was left to the Volunteer Defence Corp which was tasked with disrupting any 
Japanese troops in the event of an invasion. The government requested that much 
of the population in Northern Australia move south as the fear of invasion grew.
96
 
 
Following the Allied success in the Coral Sea in preventing the seaborne invasion, 
the Japanese attempted to access Port Moresby by heading south through Papua 
New Guinea. In July 1942, Australian forces were then sent to defend the island. 
What ensued was the famous battle along the Kokoda track. From events such as 
this it can be seen that the Battle of the Coral Sea was an important milestone in 
the Pacific campaign. However, it was not decisive in stopping Japanese 
aggression, nor did it completely negate the threat to Australia. The Australian 
government was still required to introduce conscription and other measures to 
ensure the safety of Australia.  
 
Any plans which the Japanese had for an invasion of Australia were thwarted, at 
least temporarily, by the defeats  suffered in the Coral Sea and at Midway. 
However, Japanese personnel did, in fact, land on Australian soil. Suzuhko 
Mizumo spent two days on the Northern Australian mainland in 1944.
97  The 
importance of the Battle of the Coral Sea can now be seen, after maps of Australia 
indicating particular routes, water storage areas and other knowledge were found 
in Tokyo after the war’s end.
98
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well have been needed if the Battle of the Coral Sea was not a success. As stated 
earlier, if the Japanese were able to capture Port Moresby and control the shipping 
lanes to the north of Australia, they would have been able to conduct considerably 
more air-raids on the mainland and possibly launch an invasion attempt.  
 
The Battle of the Coral Sea proved to be the catalyst that the Allies needed to gain 
ascendancy in the Pacific. However, this ascendancy would not have been 
possible if not for particular decisions made by the government following the end 
of the battle. Some of these decisions were directly or indirectly enacted due to the 
outcome of the battle. The sending of troops to the Kokoda track to fight off the 
Japanese land advance was due to the success of the Coral Sea. The success 
acquired by the Allied navies was now required to be sustained by the army. The 
introduction of conscription may not have been necessary if the battle had 
completely saved Australia, but there is no doubt that the battle played a large part 
in the eventual success of the Allies. As Prime Minister Curtin expressed months 
after, in the immediate aftermath it simply provided breathing space from a 
relentless few months in the Pacific which had seen the Japanese advance at a 
rapid pace. It was now his job to rally the Australian people after an event which 
provided good news. 
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Chapter 3 
Midway: The End of the Beginning 
 
The Battle of Midway is said to be the greatest naval battle of the Second World 
War.
99
 
 This battle eventuated one month after the Allied strategic victory in the 
Coral Sea. Fought between 4 and 7 June 1942, Midway delivered a decisive 
victory to the American fleet. Midway consolidated the supremacy of the aircraft 
carrier in the Pacific, a battle tactic first initiated during the engagement in the 
Coral Sea. The battle also changed the strategic dynamic of the Pacific campaign. 
The Allies were now able to fully achieve their objective of taking the offensive.  
In 1953, the Townsville Daily Bulletin suggested that the Battle of Midway was 
undoubtedly the Pacific War’s turning point, a turning point which began in the 
Coral Sea. The battle in the “Coral Sea was the end of the beginning Midway was 
the beginning of the end.”
100  However, recently, some commentators have 
purported that Midway was not the turning point of the Pacific campaign, but 
rather one episode in a series of events.
101
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Pacific War. For this reason, it can be seen that the battles, combined, were 
significant not just to the defence of Australia but to the overall defence of the 
Pacific region.  
 
The battles of the Coral Sea and Midway can be considered in a combined sense, 
as the Battle of the Coral Sea was somewhat of an unfinished battle, with neither 
side choosing to continue the fight until an outright victory was decided. Due to 
this, at least from a common observance, Midway has overshadowed the Coral 
Sea due to its decisive nature. However, it can be argued that Midway should be 
considered as a continuation of the Coral Sea. With these battles combined, they 
ultimately decided the security of Australia and turned the tide of the Pacific war 
in favour of the Allies. 
 
The Battle of Midway eventuated from a Japanese attempt to capture Midway 
Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. The Japanese intended to invade the strategic Pacific 
outpost, drawing in the US Pacific fleet, where Japanese carriers, lying in wait, 
would deliver a conclusive blow. US code breakers had intercepted Japanese 
messages which indicated that an invasion force was being sent to the Aleutian 
Islands and also to another location, assumed to be Midway. The intentions of the 
Japanese to take Midway were made known when a bogus, un-coded US 
transmission was sent from Midway saying that their ability to produce fresh 
drinking water had been diminished. A Japanese transmission was then   46 
intercepted noting that invading troops should make extra provisions for drinking 
water.
102
 
 
Once the Japanese intentions were obvious, the American fleet was able to 
reverse the plan of a Japanese ambush. The Americans were also able to further 
count on what can only be referred to as luck once they were in position off the 
coast of Midway. Scouting planes were sent out from Japanese carriers to search 
for any Allied warships in the area. The Japanese scouting plane which was 
assigned to search the position where the American fleet was lying in wait 
suffered mechanical problems for twenty minutes, allowing the US Navy further 
time to prepare their ambush. As the battle progressed, the Japanese suffered a 
devastating defeat in which their four carriers present were sunk. The Americans 
lost the Yorktown, which had been rapidly repaired after being damaged in the 
Battle of the Coral Sea.  
 
The Midway atoll was a small but significant piece of real estate. It stood, as its 
name suggests, in the middle of the Pacific. Whoever controlled this atoll might 
ultimately hold the balance of power in the Pacific Ocean. If the Japanese had 
been able to capture it, they would have had an uninterrupted run to Hawaii, 
especially if the US Pacific Fleet had been destroyed or significantly damaged. 
The US would have found it very difficult to force their way back into contention 
for victory. It would have been possible for the Japanese to set up a defensive 
system across the Western Pacific, which would have allowed invasion of several 
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islands, as well as the isolation of Australia.
103
 
 Although Midway lay thousands 
of miles away, its position was indeed significant for the ultimate security of 
Australia.  
The United States had three carriers present at Midway: Enterprise, Hornet and 
Yorktown. These were all pivotal in the action against the Japanese carrier force. 
The Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu were the fundamental part of the IJNs force 
headed to Midway, accompanied by a vast array of cruisers and destroyers.
  104 
The Japanese had a formidable force. These forces were, however, not a match 
for the signals intelligence of the Americans which gave them the upper hand in 
the battle. The skill of the American aviators allowed them to capitalise on this. 
Amidst the damage and carnage, the engagement would be known as a battle 
which changed the course of history.
105
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Map 3: How the battle unfolded.
106
 
 
The Battle of Midway, although one of the most famous battles in history, as 
Willmott discusses, was a battle which cannot stand separate from that of the 
Coral Sea and Guadalcanal which also affected the outcome of the Pacific War. 
Although Willmott does not see any individual battle being decisive in the Pacific 
campaign, he does note that “the Coral Sea was the type of battle the Japanese 
had to win quickly, decisively and at small cost to themselves if they were to 
avoid ultimate defeat”.
  107
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  Midway,  on the other hand, was a battle which 
transformed the United States from a power in the Pacific to the major power of 
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tandem to win the war for the Allies. It can be argued that the safety of Australia 
was initially gained after the Battle of the Coral Sea, but was then all but assured 
following the Battle of Midway when the Americans gained the naval ascendancy 
in the Pacific for the Allies.  
 
While the Second World War was still in progress in June 1943, a statement in 
The Cairns Post  presented the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway as 
engagements that shaped the course of Australia’s destiny.  
In those days the course of our destiny was shaped. The 
political mind has told us that the battle of the Coral Sea 
delivered us from the enemy, and that, by the decisive 
victory at Midway Island, we gained control of the South 
Pacific waters.
108
It is important to note that the combined effectiveness of these battles was not 
unknown to the Australian wartime population. 
  
 
The Battle of Midway and Coral Sea have been linked together as equally 
important by authors such as Willmott as well in newspaper articles such as that 
of the Cairns Post and The Courier-Mail.
109 As discussed, both battles needed to 
be won by the same side for the battles to be considered significant. It has been 
argued that if the Japanese were able to take Port Moresby, it would have meant 
nothing if they were not successful at Midway the following month.
110
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was publically reported in June 1942 that both battles had defined the forecast of 
the war, it was also noted that, “for Australia they mean that the threat of invasion 
has been removed for months at least”.
111
 
  
If following the strategic success they had in the Coral Sea the US had not 
consolidated at Midway it would have been considered a missed chance to gain 
control of the Pacific. There can therefore be little doubt that whoever achieved 
ascendancy in the Coral Sea would also have to achieve victory at Midway. As a 
result of the success that  the Allies had in preventing Port Moresby being 
captured, and the prevention of the possible isolation or invasion of Australia, the 
Coral Sea was indeed a strategically vital battle to win. The Battle of Midway 
was a continuation of this and essential for sustained security.  
 
At Midway, the Japanese fleet had suffered the greatest defeat in its history.
112
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The loss of four fleet carriers proved decisive as the war continued. The Japanese, 
following six months of unstoppable victories throughout the Pacific, had finally 
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The Japanese arguably did not have a long-term strategic plan for the war.
113 This 
lack of foresight may have cost the Japanese dearly. Their peak of power perhaps 
came too early, while the US were still on the rise. Rear Admiral Matome Ugaki 
noted in his diary at the beginning of 1942 that “the course of events during this 
year will determine the fate of the war”.
114
 
 The battles which took place certainly 
did determine the fate of the war. The loss of four carriers in one battle can be 
regarded as nothing less than disastrous.  
With success later in the year at Guadalcanal and the prevention of the Japanese 
reaching Port Moresby by land, it became evident that any major threat posed to 
Australia was all but gone. However, even before Guadalcanal or the Kokoda 
campaign began, The Argus of Melbourne reported on 15 June 1942, the Navy 
Department’s statement that the Coral Sea engagement prevented Australia from 
either being invaded or isolated. It also noted that the Coral Sea allowed Australia 
and other Pacific Islands to strengthen their bases.
115 In contrast to this, just three 
days earlier, The Canberra Times reported that the “worst period of the war” was 
about to begin. The Minister for the Army, Mr Forde, believed that the Japanese 
would not accept the defeats at Midway and the Coral Sea, and would launch 
further attacks for which Australia must be prepared.
116
 
  
                                                           
113 Healy, Midway 1942, 9. 
114 Quoted in Ibid 
115 “Jap Invasion Plans Twice Upset: Losses in Coral Sea and Midway Fights.” The Argus, June 15, 1942, 
http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article11981215 (accessed 3 September 2011).  
116 “Worst Period of War Ahead For Australia.” The Canberra Times, June 12, 1942, http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-
article2561796 (accessed 3 October, 2011).   52 
Bateson has argued that the Coral Sea should not be seen as a tactical victory to 
the Japanese, but rather a tactical draw, while it was unquestionably a strategic 
victory for the Allies.
117 This may have in turn had a psychological effect on the 
Japanese who “threw away one of their greatest opportunities of the Pacific war” 
when they failed to continue with their amphibious invasion attempt of Port 
Moresby.
118
 
 The failure of the Japanese to successfully achieve their ambition of 
capturing Port Moresby in May 1942 undoubtedly led to their downfall. If indeed 
it was a draw at the Coral Sea, then this gave all the more expectation that 
Midway would become the pivotal moment in the Pacific War. 
At Midway, the “combination of intelligence, tactics, courage and sacrifice 
forever changed the course of the war and world history”.
119
 
 As this statement 
suggests, Midway has in some respects overshadowed the confrontation in the 
Coral Sea. It must, however, be asserted that without the Coral Sea being a 
strategic success for the Allies, Midway may have turned out differently. If the 
Yorktown  had been sunk, rather than damaged, it would have affected the 
American firepower the following month, possibly handing the Japanese the 
victory which they craved.   
The Battle of the Coral Sea had a profound impact on the Japanese preparedness 
for their planned attack on Midway. The policy, which was inherent in the 
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Japanese Navy, was to always use their best pilots on operations, rather than 
sending a portion of them to work as instructors to teach the next generation. The 
pilot losses suffered by the Japanese at the Battle of the Coral Sea left vacant 
positions which  could  not be filled by combat-ready pilots with sufficient 
training. This policy severely hindered their chances of victory at Midway, with 
the  Zuikaku  being unavailable because of  a lack of competent pilots being 
attached to the ship.
120
 
 The lack of further carrier power for the Japanese proved 
critical.  
Former Admiral in the Imperial Japanese Navy, Nobutake Kondo, wrote in 1951 
that there was no doubt that the Battle of Midway proved to be a turning point in 
the Pacific War.
121  The failure of the Japanese to succeed in the Coral Sea and at 
Midway can be attributed to good intelligence on behalf of the Allies as well as 
mistakes on the part of the Japanese. Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton has noted 
that “If it had not been for radio intelligence, the first we would have heard about 
the Coral Sea probably would have been a victory announcement by the Tokyo 
Domei  news agency”.
122  It has also been claimed that the Japanese practised 
manoeuvres that they intended to use at Midway during the battle of the Coral 
Sea. This has been attributed to arrogance by the Japanese, who had become 
overconfident in their operations.
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capture Port Moresby, which could have possibly changed the outcome at 
Midway and the dynamic of the war. 
 
The Battle of the Coral Sea provided some assurance that the Japanese were not 
undefeatable. Mark Grimsley has argued that at the Battle of the Coral Sea, 
tactical errors cost the Japanese heavily. If indeed they had successfully captured 
Port Moresby, they would have been able to strengthen their defensive perimeter, 
and launch attacks against bases  in Northern Australia. It would have also 
allowed the Japanese to have further assets in the area for future Allied offensive 
campaigns such as Guadalcanal.
124
 
  
Geoffrey Till has noted that “Midway was not the turning point of the war in the 
Pacific that many deem it to be. Rather, it was an inspiring symbol of a decisive 
campaign”.
125 Three battles in 1942 signified the changing tide of the war: Coral 
Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal. Till regards these three battles as a combined 
campaign of which Midway has become an inspiring representation.
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including Okinawa which cost 12,000 American lives and over 100,000 Japanese 
lives.
127
 
 
On 8 December 1941, the President of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
noted in his Joint Address to Congress that “with confidence in our armed forces- 
with the unbounding determination of our people- we will gain the inevitable 
triumph”.
128 This triumph looked a distant aspiration in early 1942. The battles at 
Coral Sea and Midway as combined actions, however, looked to change the 
course of the war to a triumph. The early portion of 1942 was a dark period for 
the Allies, “then came a ray of light for the Allies out of the Coral Sea, dawn 
broke over Midway”.
129
 
 This statement suggests that the two battles have a close 
relationship.  This pushed the Japanese into a defensive role which was 
unexpected for them following their early successes in the region.  
If Midway was captured by the Japanese, it would have enabled the entire 
Western Pacific region to be under their control. The isolation of Australia would 
be a very real possibility, and the return to the Philippines by the US would have 
been in serious doubt. Depending on the damage that the United States suffered at 
Midway, it would have allowed the Japanese to negotiate a peace deal on their 
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terms.
130
 
 For this reason it could be concluded that the Battle of Midway was 
significant in its own right. Defeat in the battle would have had a detrimental 
effect on not only the assets of the American military, limiting their ability to 
immediately launch a counter-attack, but also the morale of the Allies as a whole. 
The battles at Midway and the Coral Sea were two of the battles which set the 
southern limit of naval expansion of the Japanese.
131 February 1943 looked to be 
a safe period for Australia, with both the Coral Sea and Midway being well in the 
past. However, Captain John Collins, the former commander of HMAS Sydney, 
believed that Australia was still vulnerable to an invasion. Collins was quoted in 
The Courier-Mail saying “I don’t think Australia is yet completely removed from 
the possibility of invasion”. Collins also noted that defence against any new 
thrusts that might be launched against Australia must be prepared for.
132
 
 
Peter Stanley contends that there was no Battle for Australia. Stanley purports 
that there was no threat of Japanese invasion as a result of the success of the 
Allies in 1942. Stanley, however, does concede that if these battles had come to a 
different conclusion, Australia may have come under Japanese threat.
133
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present following the victories at Midway and along the Kokoda track.
134 
Bombing raids were still carried out on the Australian mainland. The bombing of 
towns in the Northern Territory, Western Australia and Queensland continued 
well into 1943.
135 If the bombings are used as a measure of the success of the 
battles in the Coral Sea and at Midway, then the battles could be seen as 
unsuccessful. The last bombing raid on Australia was conducted against Darwin 
in November 1943, well over a year after the victories of the US aircraft 
carriers.
136
 
 
The battles of the Coral Sea and Midway will go down in history as the time in 
which the aircraft carrier became supreme in war at sea. Apart from this new way 
to fight at sea, the battles served as significant moments in the Pacific war. The 
failure of the Japanese to secure outright victory in the Coral Sea was 
compounded by their comprehensive defeat at Midway. This was pivotal in the 
outcome of the Pacific War. The Allies prevented the Japanese from reaching 
Port Moresby during Operation MO and the US victory at Midway changed the 
direction of the war. It has become evident that the battles did not stop the air 
raids on the Australian mainland, but they did drive the Japanese further away 
from achieving their ultimate goal of controlling the Pacific and Southern Asia. 
There was no invasion or isolation of Australia.  
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In the context of the Pacific War, and the ultimate security of Australia, these two 
battles played a fundamental role. While the Coral Sea provided immediate 
security from threat of invasion or isolation, further battles against the Japanese 
were needed to insure that this would continue and this occurred at Midway. 
These battles should be seen in a combined sense, with the Coral Sea acting as a 
stepping stone to ultimate victory in the Pacific. However, it could also be said 
that the Battle of the Coral Sea loses some significance when directly compared 
with Midway. Nonetheless, both battles must be seen in conjunction with one 
another to appreciate their significance in the overall Pacific War. Despite 
Midway having overshadowed the Coral Sea in the time since, Midway 
completed the groundwork which the Allies began during their action against the 
Japanese Port Moresby invasion force.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   59 
Chapter 4 
Commemoration: Remembering the Sacrifice 
 
The Battle of the Coral Sea, fought sixty-nine years ago has become a pivotal part 
of Australian and American military history. In the early stages of the Pacific 
War, the Japanese had been virtually unstoppable. The American and Australian 
naval forces present in the Coral Sea were able to force the Japanese back from 
their objective at Port Moresby. Subsequently, the Battle of the Coral Sea was 
dubbed the battle that saved Australia. This claim, although arguably referring to 
safety from invasion, can also be seen as safety from isolation, which Australia 
would have suffered if the Japanese had been successful in their mission. It 
might, therefore, be assumed that a battle of such purported significance as this 
would be commemorated in an equally proportionate way. In the postwar years, 
this battle has been commemorated in numerous ways: from annual services in 
several Australian cities to memorial parks built in its honour to publications 
being dedicated specifically to the battle. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the 
memorialisation of the Battle of the Coral Sea, especially in recent years, has not 
been consistent with its initial perceived significance.  
 
Michael Keren asserts that while commemoration of war is important, “the ranks 
of those who hold memories of the war shrink, and while a new generation of 
youngsters comes on stage, often disinterested in its elders’ war stories”. War,   60 
therefore,  may  not be commemorated to everyone’s satisfaction.
137  There are 
many forms of war commemoration, including ceremonies, monuments, art, film 
and literature. These forms of memorialisation vary with time, popular culture 
and the collective memory of society.
138
 
  
Over the years the Battle of the Coral Sea has been commemorated in a number 
of locations and by several high ranking military and government officials from 
both the United States and Australia. In his letter to the Australian people 
regarding the commemoration of the battle in 2010, US President Barack Obama 
claimed that the “Battle holds a unique place in history of both our nations”.
139 
The President asserted in 2011 that we should honour the sacrifice of those who 
perished and for the loss we shared at sea.
140
 
  
It is evident that the battle, which played a vital role in the prevention of Japanese 
extension throughout the Pacific in the early stages of the war, has had an impact 
on both nations. At the 69-year anniversary service in Canberra, US Ambassador 
to Australia, Jeffrey L. Bleich, noted that in 1942 Australia was on the brink of 
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Japanese invasion. Consequently the battle was of the utmost importance; it was 
“a battle that changed the course of history”.
141
 
  
Australia’s former Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Russ Crane, has noted that the 
battle was the main factor causing the Japanese to reconsider their campaign to 
take Port Moresby by sea.
142
 
 This campaign, which would eventually be shifted 
to a land assault later in 1942, could have had a detrimental impact on the 
Australian mainland. The Australian people felt a sense of relief and liberation at 
the knowledge of the Japanese being turned back for the first time in the war. It 
would appear that both the US and Australia view this battle as an historical 
turning point. 
Veterans  of the battle  believe it should indeed be remembered and 
commemorated as a major turning point in the war.
143
                                                           
141 Jeffrey L. Bleich, “Remarks of Ambassador Bleich Remembering the Battle of the Coral Sea at the Australia-
American Memorial in Russell, ACT” 
 The ability of the Allied 
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   62 
If Australia was cut off from American supply and support, it may have had a 
very similar impact to an invasion. It would have been much the same as the 
impact the British would have suffered if the Kriegsmarine had been successful in 
preventing all supply ships from reaching Britain across the Atlantic. 
 
The way in which the Battle of the Coral Sea has been commemorated indicates 
that the battle has a rich history in Australia. Even so, other events in the Pacific, 
such as the Battle of Midway, may be of greater historical importance to the 
United States. This is understandable, since the Midway engagement was 
considered a decisive action in which it became clear that the Allies were able to 
take the offensive in the war for the Pacific. The Battle of Midway has been 
commemorated more by the US than the Battle of the Coral Sea. Commemoration 
ceremonies are held in the US to mark the anniversary of the Battle of Midway, 
such as that which was held in Washington in June 2011.
144
 
 
In 1942, it is likely that the relief that the Australians felt at the quelling of the 
Japanese advance was immeasurable. It must be noted, however, that the Battle of 
the Coral Sea alone did not save Australia. This is reflected in the 
memorialisation of other battles. The Battle of the Coral Sea, in terms of 
commemoration, has often been overshadowed by battles such as those which 
took place along the Kokoda track. These are more popularly known within the 
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community. This battle began after the failed amphibious assault and also had a 
role in maintaining the security of Australia. It is likely that the Australian people 
feel a greater need to commemorate a battle which only involved Australian 
troops, rather than an Allied effort.  Encounters such as Kokoda have also 
become popular because people, even today, can experience some facets of the 
battle by walking the track. However, it can  also be said that Australians 
remember the sacrifice of the Americans at the Coral Sea, as the commemoration 
of the Coral Sea serves as a reminder of America’s contribution to the defence of 
Australia.
145
 
 
Naval historian Dr David Stevens suggests that the Coral Sea battle should be 
“remembered by everyone because in reality it should be up there with Gallipoli 
and Kokoda”.
146 This sentiment is also shared by veteran Tommy Simms, who 
stated, “looking back I don’t think I have done anything ever any more important 
than the Coral Sea Battle”.
147
 
 It is evident that the battle does hold a special place 
in the history of Australia, regardless of its lower profile compared to other 
military engagements.  
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The commemoration of the battle each year, with a large American presence of 
government and military personnel in Australia, is evidence that Australians 
today still strongly recognise the role of the American forces in the defence of 
Australia. Vice Admiral Crane noted that “We continue to remember and honour 
their sacrifice today as a turning point in the war and in our relationship with the 
United States. As Australians, we remain grateful for the Americans who came to 
our aid with whom we fought as one”.
148
 
  
As a result of this relationship, the Australian-American Association has become 
a prevalent force of social interaction for the two nations. Although formed 
before the war in 1936, it has only become prevalent in the years since. It has 
served to encourage relations between the two nations. The Association 
encourages the commemoration of the Battle of the Coral Sea among other 
activities.
149
 
 The Association should be noted as an integral part of US-Australian 
relations, especially in regards to remembrance of wars which both nations have 
shared. As it stands, memorial services for the Coral Sea are held annually in 
major Australian capital cities and are hosted by the Australian-American 
Association. Collectively this shows both nations still remember the sacrifice by 
sailors and airmen in the Coral Sea.  
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Figure 4: Commemorating the 69
th anniversary  
at the Australian-American memorial in Canberra, ACT.
150
 
 
During the Anzac Day commemorations in 2002, Robert Bowen Ault marched in 
honour of his father, a naval aviator killed during the Battle of the Coral Sea. He 
noted that “the people of Australia have never forgotten that the United States 
came to their defense at a critical time early in the war”.
151
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 The commemoration 
around Australia in 2011, involving both Australian and US personnel, shows that 
both nations are committed to remembering those who fought and died in the 
battle. Today, both nations also share a close bond which was forged during the 
Pacific campaign, especially the Coral Sea, when the US came to Australia’s aid. 
Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard has acknowledged this relationship: “to 
151 Robert Bowen Ault, “History & Heroism Remembered Down Under 
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remember that in our darkest days we have been glad to see each other’s face and 
hear each other’s voice. In our days together under attack in the Pacific.” 
152
 
  
It can be argued that if the Battle of the Coral Sea was truly the battle which 
saved Australia, the commemoration and the public acknowledgment of the battle 
should be greater. In recent years Anzac Day dawn services have gained 
popularity.
153
 
 With the Gallipoli campaign often credited with being the birth of 
Australia, this is understandable. Anzac Day has grown to incorporate much more 
than just the Gallipoli campaign. It could be argued that a perceived lack of 
commemoration of other battles is due to Australia having a history of many 
meaningful and pivotal battles, and all are commemorated collectively.  
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Figure 4.1 Plaque at the Coral Sea Battle Memorial Park, Cardwell, QLD.
154
 
 
In Cardwell, Queensland, the Coral Sea Battle Memorial Park was opened in 
1984.  The  memorial pays tribute to the battle which it reports as saving 
Australia.
155
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 A whole park being dedicated as a memorial, rather than a single 
plaque or monument, is noteworthy. What is also notable is the location. The 
battle holds a special place in the history of Australia, but especially that of 
Queensland. The north east was the closest Australian territory to the action, and 
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and sea battle to save Australia. It is also a lasting memorial to those who lost 
their lives defending this nation”.
156  The memorial in Cardwell also 
acknowledges the “ship and crew of the United States Aircraft Carrier USS 
Lexington”.
157
 
 
The main site of Australian war commemoration is the Australian War Memorial 
in Canberra. Initially its two aims were commemoration and understanding.
158 
Often the aim of war memorials is to allow people to grieve for those who did not 
return home. For Australia during both World Wars, this included thousands of 
service men and women. This memorial acts as a form of observance or 
funeral.
159 “Here is their spirit, in the heart of the land they loved; and here we 
guard the record which they themselves made”.
160
 
 Australia celebrates a proud 
military history. Memorials are a large part of this, with many dedicated to a 
specific service or event.  
The location of a memorial should be considered significant, such as that of the 
memorials to HMAS Sydney II in Geraldton and Carnarvon, Western Australia; 
as well as that of the Navy Memorial Park in Rockingham, Western Australia. 
The Sydney memorials are located in towns significant to where the ship was 
                                                           
156 Queensland War Memorial Register.  
157 Queensland War Memorial Register, 
http://www.qldwarmemorials.com.au/Memorial%20Photos/USS%20Lexington%20cv2.JPG (accessed 21 May, 
2011). 
158  Michael McKernan, Here is Their Spirit: A History of the Australian War Memorial 1917-1990, 
(Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1991), xii. 
159 Ibid, x. 
160 Ibid, Cover.   69 
believed to be sunk, in arguably Australia’s greatest maritime tragedy on 19 
November 1941. The Navy Memorial Park, which has several plaques and 
monuments dedicated to several ships and naval units, is located directly across 
Cockburn Sound from the RAN’s West Australian Base, HMAS Stirling. With 
the Coral Sea memorial in Cardwell being as close to the action as possible the 
location should be considered noteworthy as the Lexington was damaged only 
450 miles east of Townsville.
161
 
  
 
Figure 4.2 (a): HMAS Sydney II Memorial, Geraldton, WA
162
 
 
Figure 4.2 (b): Naval Memorial Park, Rockingham, WA.
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The geographic location of Australia has prevented many war dead being buried 
on Australian soil, due to the vast majority of Australian forces being deployed to 
other sections of the globe. For this reason, the Australian War Memorial and 
other memorials serve a vital function as a visual site of grieving and 
remembrance similar to a tombstone or cemetery. Australia’s geographical 
location has also affected other forms of war memorialisation and memory.  
 
There are  some locations of the Coral Sea commemoration that are more 
noteworthy than others. Commemorations in Hobart are held for the ship which 
bore its name and took part in the battle.
164  It was claimed in 2010 that “68 years 
on and the Battle of the Coral Sea remains as relevant now as it was in 1942”.
165
 
 
If it indeed was as influential as many claim in preventing the invasion of Port 
Moresby and finally defeating the Japanese in a key engagement, should it be 
commemorated further?  
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Figure 4.3: Plaque commemorating HMAS Hobart at the Naval Memorial 
Park, Rockingham, WA.
166
 
 
In 1946, it was decided that a week should be dedicated to Coral Sea 
commemoration.
167  In 1947, Labor minister  Mr. Fuller  “suggested that the 
anniversary of the Coral Sea Battle during the Pacific War should in future be set 
aside as a day for special commemoration”.
168 It was then stated in 1951 that the 
aim of commemorating the Battle of the Coral Sea was to allow people to 
understand the impact the battle had on the Australian population. It has also been 
noted that Coral Sea Week should not take the place of Anzac Day, but rather, 
both should hold an important place on the Australian calendar.
169
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Coral Sea Week has moved into a more collective commemoration of the Battle 
for Australia, as its significance has diminished over time.
170
 
  
In 1997 James Bowen first proposed a Battle for Australia Day, to be observed 
annually.
171 In 1942, Prime Minister John Curtin first coined the term Battle for 
Australia. This term reflected the geographical location of Australia and its 
vulnerability to Japanese attack. The term has since come to include the Battle of 
the Coral Sea, Kokoda and Guadalcanal.
172
 
 All three of these battles were seen as 
direct interventions in the Japanese attempt to isolate and control Australia.  
As a result of recognition of these Pacific battles the Returned Services League 
and the Department of Veterans Affairs instigated a Battle for Australia 
commemoration held at the Melbourne Shrine of Remembrance in 1999.
173 The 
Battle for Australia Day was proclaimed by the Governor General and is held 
annually on the first Wednesday of September. “This annual event 
commemorates the service and sacrifice of all those who served in defence of 
Australia in 1942 and 1943 during a period when our nation appeared to face its 
greatest peril.”
174
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days such as Anzac Day and the Battle for Australia Day are often umbrellas for 
war commemoration in general as they celebrate and acknowledge much more 
than one battle. 
 
For the ten year anniversary of the Battle of the Coral Sea, a special souvenir 
booklet was produced by the Australian-American Association. It stated that the 
significance of the battle “was not generally realised until its historical and 
geographical importance became evident in the march of events towards the final 
defeat of Japan”.
175 The battle was later recognised as a milestone in Australian 
history as it marked the nearest approach of hostile forces to the mainland and 
“deliverance from threatened invasion”.
176
 
 
In 1992, to mark the 50
th anniversary of the battle, The Australian produced a 
special edition newspaper, including seven pages dedicated to the battle. It 
discussed all matters from a description of the battle, to the Australian-American 
relationship gained through it and also the controversial Brisbane Line. Although 
the paper recognised that Australia may not have been under direct threat of an 
invasion, it still recognised the battle’s importance in the history of Australia.
177
 
 
Commemoration is not just confined to specific celebratory days or monuments. 
There are other socially popular ways of commemorating events. The Battle of 
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the Coral Sea has had many books written specifically about it or has had 
substantial chapters dedicated to it in other publications. A book such as H.P. 
Willmott’s The Barrier and the Javelin has become a widely used source for 
detail on the Pacific War during the first half of 1942.
178 Other books such as 
Action Stations Coral Sea: The Australian Commander’s Story, have been written 
specifically on the battle.
  179 There have also been publications written by the 
Australian-American Association  on the battle.
180
 
  The wide array of accounts 
which have been written, indicate that the battle was of great significance. 
However, this significance can be attributed not only to the impact it had on 
Australia, but perhaps also to the change it brought to naval warfare and its 
impact in the early stages of the Pacific campaign.  
The writing of books and other publications on the Battle of the Coral Sea have 
been an important way of memorialising the battle. They also have an important 
role in communicating the story of what occurred. Through this they enable new 
generations to remember and gain knowledge of a historically important event. 
There are, however, other World War Two battles, both naval and land based, 
which are perceived as more significant and have gained greater media attention. 
High profile actions such as the Battle of Britain, Midway and the struggle 
between Allied navies and the Kriegsmarine in the Atlantic are amongst those 
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battles regarded as more significant than the Battle of the Coral Sea.
181
 
 Therefore 
these  military engagements have more  published  works, movies and 
documentaries produced about them and further monuments are built in their 
honour.  
Without doubt the Battle of the Coral Sea holds a significant place in the history 
of Australia. This significance, however, is not necessarily commonly known by 
today’s population or shown in the way it is commemorated. Although there are 
commemoration services held each year, monuments built and books written, the 
Battle of the Coral Sea has been somewhat overshadowed by other military 
campaigns of the twentieth century. Battles such as Midway have ranked amongst 
the greatest of all time. For this reason they have become more famous in the 
popular mind.
182
 
  
Although other battles have arguably been more significant, the Battle of the 
Coral Sea has had a large impact on both the citizens of Australia and the United 
States. Commemoration of war in Australia has played a large role in defining a 
national identity. This can be seen through the resurgence of Anzac Day 
ceremonies, a day which now encompasses the commemoration of all battles in 
which Australia participated. The commemoration of the Battle of the Coral Sea 
as part of the Battle for Australia has been the subject of a combined celebration 
in many senses. As the years have progressed, the specific commemoration of the 
                                                           
181 History Channel, “The Greatest Battles of World War II” 
http://www.historychannel.com.au/microsite/greatest-battles-of-ww2/?id=10 (accessed May 19, 2011). 
182 Ibid.   76 
Battle of the Coral Sea has diminished, as it has moved into a collective 
memorialisation. Due to this, it could be argued that it has not received the 
recognition or the commemoration that a single battle, which is said to have saved 
Australia, deserves.  
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Conclusion 
 
The Battle of the Coral Sea was a significant moment in the Pacific War. The 
Japanese had swiftly moved through the Pacific and South-East Asia after they 
attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Subsequently, the Allies had been on 
the defensive. Singapore and the Dutch East Indies had fallen, General Douglas 
MacArthur was forced from the Philippines and for the first time enemy action 
had taken place on Australian soil with the bombings of Darwin in February. The 
security of Australia in early 1942 was far from guaranteed.  
 
A Japanese invasion of Australia was not guaranteed, however, it could be argued 
that isolation from the US and the other Pacific Islands was probable if Papua 
New Guinea became Japanese territory. The men who fought in the Coral Sea 
prevented such an action from occurring. Although it was not a definitive victory 
to the Allies, their strategic triumph was enough to ensure the safety of Australia, 
at least for the foreseeable future. As Prime Minister Curtin said of the men 
fighting the battle, “it may be for many of them the ‘last full measure of their 
devotion’ – to accomplish the increased safety and security of this territory”.
183
 
 
This statement was certainly true; the safety of Australia was increased following 
the strategic defeat of the Japanese in the Coral Sea. 
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Britain was preoccupied with fighting Germany in Europe, the Middle East and 
North Africa and showed very little interest in sending military assets to 
Australasia. The lack of British military units in and around this area had caused 
concern for the Australian population with the Japanese in such close surrounds. 
Australia was reliant on America and its forces to ensure its security. American 
servicemen would be based in Australia, often to the dismay of their Australian 
counterparts. However, Australia and America forged a strong bond throughout 
the Pacific campaign. This bond continued into current times and is expressed by 
the respective leaders of the nations. Barrack Obama has stated: 
The cooperation between American and Australian naval 
forces during this battle marked an important evolution in 
our alliance. This alliance would ultimately help win 
World War II in the Pacific theatre, and was formalized in 
1951 through the signing of the ANZUS Treaty. Almost 
70 years later, our alliance remains one of the most 
important and dynamic in the world.
184
 
 
Australia and the United States gained a strong relationship through the time that 
they spent allied together in the Pacific campaign. Prime Minister Julia Gillard 
said in 2011, “To remember that in our darkest days we have been glad to see 
each other’s face and hear each other’s voice. In our days together under attack in 
the Pacific. In our decades together from Korea to the Gulf.”
185
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The commemoration of the Battle of the Coral Sea has been widespread, despite 
it being overshadowed somewhat by battles such as Kokoda and Midway. As 
time progresses, particular historical events may not be commemorated or 
remembered to everyone’s satisfaction.
186 With memorials built in Queensland, 
and ceremonies held to honour the battle, and also several publications written in 
its honour, it can be argued that the Battle of the Coral Sea still has a large impact 
on the Australian war remembrance landscape. The Australian-American 
Association has organised services for Coral Sea commemoration in Australian 
capital cities.
187  Whilst  the relief that the Australian population felt after the 
success in the Coral Sea was focused on the threat of invasion, the 
commemoration of the Coral Sea has shifted to a wider more generalised Battle 
for Australia commemoration, held each September.
188
 
 
The Battle of the Coral Sea was followed one month later by the Battle of 
Midway. Midway, arguably one of the most famous battles in history, is regarded 
as changing the course of the Pacific War. The Allies were eager to continue their 
successes achieved in the Coral Sea and finally force Japan to take up a defensive 
stance. This American success would flow on to future battles at Guadalcanal and 
the Australians at Kokoda, where the Allies further cemented their presence as 
the new dominant power in the Pacific. In conjunction with the Coral Sea battle, 
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Midway contributed to the safety of Australia. It was vital that the Allies built on 
their success at Coral Sea and did not once again allow the Japanese to gain the 
upper hand. 
 
It can be asserted that the Battle of Midway was merely a continuation of the 
Battle of the Coral Sea, were both belligerents broke away from contact before a 
more definitive outcome was decided. The air-raids which continued on Australia 
until the end of 1943 could be seen as a result of the strength of Allied land-based 
aircraft present in area. The Japanese, trying to prevent any further losses in the 
region would attempt to destroy such air assets located in Australia. These 
bombings should not be seen as a direct threat to the security of the Australian 
mainland, but rather a Japanese attempt to once again gain a stronghold in the 
area. It was due to combined Allied successes in numerous actions across the 
Asia-Pacific that they were not able to do this.  
 
The battle should not be considered to be the sole defender of the Australian 
mainland. The Australian government decided after the battles of Coral Sea, 
Midway and Kokoda that conscripted men should be allowed to fight overseas in 
a predefined area close to Australia. It should be noted that if the Battle of the 
Coral Sea had been as effective as once thought, that this change of legislation by 
the Australian government may not have been necessary. 
   81 
Through the government response, its relationship with Midway and the way in 
which it has been commemorated it is evident that the Battle of the Coral Sea was 
an important moment in the Pacific campaign. The battle should be 
acknowledged as the first naval battle in which surface ships never sighted one 
another. It should also be remembered for its success in securing the safety of 
Australia. The battle was the first stepping stone which the Allies could use to 
ensure the safety of Australia from possible invasion or isolation whilst leading 
them to ultimate victory in the Pacific. The battle was also the beginning of a long 
lasting relationship between Australia and the United States.  
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